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Abstract

This paper investigates whether manufacturers should be liable if consumers,
through the use of a product, cause harm to others. If consumers have deep pockets then consumer-only liability is socially desirable. With consumer insolvency,
however, consumer-only liability leads to inadequate consumer precautions, inadequate safety features, and excessive economic activity. With homogeneous
insolvent consumers, the best rule is “residual-manufacturer liability” where the
consumer bears primary responsibility and the manufacturer bears the shortfall
in damages. When consumers’ willingness-to-pay is correlated with social harm
they cause then residual-manufacturer liability distorts the market quantity. When
consumers differ in their wealth then residual-manufacturer liability creates an
inefficient cross-subsidization and an overprovision of safety features. In both
cases, consumer-only liability may be preferred to residual-manufacturer liability.
Applications, including gun manufacturer liability, are discussed.

Manufacturer Liability for Harms Caused by Consumers to Others

Bruce Hay and Kathryn E. Spier1
August 13, 2003

This paper investigates whether manufacturers should be liable if consumers,
through the use of a product, cause harm to others. If consumers have deep
pockets then consumer-only liability is socially desirable. With consumer
insolvency, however, consumer-only liability leads to inadequate consumer
precautions, inadequate safety features, and excessive economic activity. With
homogeneous insolvent consumers, the best rule is "residual-manufacturer
liability" where the consumer bears primary responsibility and the manufacturer
bears the shortfall in damages. When consumers' willingness-to-pay is correlated
with social harm they cause then residual-manufacturer liability distorts the
market quantity. When consumers differ in their wealth then residualmanufacturer liability creates an inefficient cross-subsidization and an
overprovision of safety features. In both cases, consumer-only liability may be
preferred to residual-manufacturer liability.
Applications, including gun
manufacturer liability, are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Courts have been called upon in recent years to decide whether a manufacturer should be
liable if a consumer, through the use of the manufacturer’s product, causes injury to another
person. The most salient example is the rash of lawsuits filed against firearms manufacturers,
which seek to hold them liable for the deaths and injuries caused by the criminal use of guns.
Such lawsuits have generally been unsuccessful, but the issue of the gun makers’ liability is still
hotly discussed in the legal and political arenas.2
This issue is by no means limited to guns. An automobile, for example, may hit a
pedestrian, cyclist, or motorist; alcohol consumption increases this risk even further. Motorboat
engines can lacerate swimmers. Lawnmowers fling projectiles, harming passersby. Pesticides
may poison neighbors' pets and children. Cigarette lighters may burn down apartment buildings.
And, even more dramatically, some ordinary crop fertilizers when mixed with gasoline become
extraordinarily potent explosives; this is how the bomb that destroyed the Oklahoma City federal
building was made.

One can, of course, imagine many other products whose use by the

consumer creates risks to others, raising the general question whether the manufacturer should be
liable for such risks to nonconsumers.3

2

By and large, the courts have refused to hold manufacturers liable for the injuries suffered by
nonconsumers as a consequence of consumers’ use of their products. This refusal has been
especially pronounced in cases where the injuries are the result of negligent or criminal conduct
by the consumer. The courts’ stance has been that the consumer alone is responsible for such
misbehavior. And even in cases where the accident was not the consumer’s fault, the courts have
generally been reluctant to hold the manufacturer liable to the nonconsumer, unless the product
malfunctioned. (For example, if a car’s brakes fail and a pedestrian is hurt, the pedestrian may
be able to recover from the manufacturer, provided that the brake failure is not the consumer’s
fault.) These limitations on liability have been explicated, and frequently criticized, by legal
commentators.
3
To take another example, violent movies or computer games may inspire individuals to commit
murder. These, and each of the examples given in the preceding paragraph in the text, have led
to lawsuits brought against manufacturers by nonconsumer victims of the product in question.
2
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Manufacturer liability is undesirable when consumers have adequate financial resources
and can be held personally liable for non-consumer injuries. In these circumstances, imposing
strict liability on the consumers alone is the socially optimal liability rule.4 With consumer-only
liability, consumers fully internalize the social harm caused by their product use: they bear the
cost of their own injuries directly and pay in full for the injuries suffered by others.
Consequently, they will take optimal precautions to reduce the probability of accidents, will
demand appropriate safety features from the products' manufacturers, and will consume the
socially optimal quantities.
When consumers lack the financial resources to fully compensate their victims (or are
otherwise judgment proof) then consumer-only liability fails to achieve social optimality -insolvent consumers will demand cheap, unsafe products and use them dangerously.5 When
consumers are homogeneous (with identical demand curves, financial assets, and propensities to
cause harm) the best strict liability rule holds the manufacturer responsible for the shortfall in

See Houvenagle v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 783 (Ia. App. 1983) (automobile); Dauphin Deposit
Bank and Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845 (Pa. Sup. 1991) (alcohol); Fitzpatrick
v. Madonna, 623 A.2d 322 (Pa. Sup. 1993) (outboard motor); Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
447 N.E.2d 1055 (Ill. App. 1983) (lawnmower); Mascarenas v. Miles, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 582
(W.D. Mo. 1997) (pesticide); Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1421 (E.D. Tenn.
1991) (cigarette lighter); Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613 (10th Cir.
1998) (fertilizer); Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So.2d 681 (La. App. 199) (violent movie); James v.
Meow Media Inc., Civ. No. 5:99CV-00096 (W.D. Ky. 1999) (violent computer game).
4
Hamada (1976) points out that consumer liability for bystander harm works as well when the
bystanders can sue the consumers for damages. Spence (1977) argues out that consumer liability
is less desirable when consumers misperceive the product risks.
5
This so-called "judgment-proof problem" is formalized in Shavell (1986). One could try to
give consumers a greater incentive to take care by using non-financial sanctions, such as greater
use of criminal penalties for careless or malicious product use. (This strategy might include
requirements that a consumer have a license and/or carry liability insurance, as is done with
automobiles.) Note, however, that criminal penalties are costly, and frequently ineffective.
Some individuals are undeterred by any feasible threat of criminal liability. But raising the price
of products may restrain these “undeterrable” individuals, if only by placing some products out
of financial reach. The working assumption in this paper is that the threat of direct liability (civil
or criminal) is often insufficient to force consumers to take full account of risks to third parties.
3
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non-consumer damages not covered by the financially-constrained consumer, a rule that we call
"residual-manufacturer liability."6 Although consumers still take inadequate precautions when
using risky products, manufacturers will design and produce safer products. Furthermore, the
market price will necessarily rise to reflect both the additional investments in safety and the
expected future manufacturer liability, leading consumers to choose the efficient level of
economic activity.7

Residual-manufacturer liability may be undesirable, however, when

consumers are heterogeneous.
Suppose that consumers have heterogeneous preferences and heterogeneous propensities
to cause social harm. Residual-manufacturer liability leads to distortions when the consumers'
elasticity of demand is systematically correlated with the expected social harm that they cause.
If consumers with more elastic demands cause more harm on average, then the competitive
market will oversupply the product. If consumers with less elastic demands cause more harm,
then the competitive market will undersupply the product.

Indeed, residual-manufacturer

liability may depress the level of economic activity so much that society as a whole would be
better off with consumer-only liability.
A numerical example provides intuition for this result. Suppose there is a population of
consumers, each of whom demands at most one unit of the good. Each unit costs $10 to
produce. Suppose that that 99% of the population causes no harm but 1% causes harm of $300.

6

In a sense, the argument is loosely analogous to that for vicarious liability, i.e., holding
employers liable for the negligence of their employees. Sykes, 1998, provides a survey. See
also Mattiacci and Parisi, 2002. But unlike the vicarious liability situation, the manufacturer has
little control over how the product is used after it is sold. Our approach in this paper is to
analyze the significance of such consumer heterogeneity for the issue of manufacturer liability
for dangerous products.
7
As shown by Shavell (1980), the higher price generally leads to more prudent product use.
Shavell (1980) does not discuss residual-manufacturer liability or the heterogeneity issues
discussed here.
4
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Furthermore, suppose that the safe consumers value the product less than the harmful
consumers: vL = $12.99 and vH = $310.01. All consumers are totally insolvent ex-post, while
manufacturers have deep pockets.

Finally, we assume that the manufacturers cannot

discriminate among the different consumer types.8
Notice that both types of consumer "should" purchase the product in this example: 99%
of the population creates a surplus of $2.99 while 1% of the population creates a social value of a
penny.9 With consumer-only liability, competition drives the price down to p = $10, the
manufacturers' marginal cost of production. The socially optimal outcome is obtained: all
consumers -- safe and unsafe alike -- buy the product. Now consider residual-manufacturer
liability. If both types of consumer purchased the product the price would be p = $13, above safe
consumers' valuation of $12.99. So the safe consumers would be driven from the market and the
price would subsequently rise to p = $310, the marginal production cost of $10 plus the expected
social harm caused by harmful types, $300. Only the harmful 1% of the population purchases
the product, and, for these harmful consumers, the "social surplus" is just a penny. Social
welfare has obviously fallen.10
Residual-manufacturer liability may also fail when consumers have identical harms and
demands but have heterogeneous financial assets. With consumer-only liability, the solvent
consumers would internalize the damages caused by their product use and would demand safety
features and be prudent in their purchase decisions and product use. Insolvent consumers, on the
other hand, would purchase unsafe products and take too little care. With residual-manufacturer
8

Alternatively, one could assume that there is a resale market making price discrimination
infeasible: the low harm types could always resell the product to the high harm types.
9
The social surplus when the safe consumers purchase the product is $12.99 − $10.00 = $2.99
while the social surplus for the unsafe consumers is $310.01 − $10.00 − $300.00 = $.01 .
10
If the social surplus for the unsafe consumers was negative in this example then the market
would cease to exist.
5
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liability the solvent consumers may be driven out of the market. Furthermore, in the separating
equilibrium the solvent consumers are supplied with excessively safe products. These distortions
may be so severe that it is better to impose liability on the consumers alone rather than have the
manufacturer bear the shortfall in non-consumer damages.
The issues raised here are distinct from the large literature that focuses on product
injuries to consumers. Where injuries to consumers are involved, consumers and manufacturers
jointly absorb the costs of such injuries (with the allocation depending on the contract struck
between them), and so have a natural joint incentive to take optimal precautions against injury.
To put it another way, product injuries to consumers are largely internalized in well-functioning
markets (Hamada, 1976; Landes and Posner, 1984 and 1987).11 Even without any manufacturer
liability imposed by law, consumers would be willing to pay a premium for safer products that
reduce their personal risk and to use risky products prudently. Consequently, the economic
arguments for products liability for consumer injuries have focused on situations involving
transactions costs and market imperfections. Manufacturer liability for consumer injuries may
be desirable, for example, when consumers misperceive product risks (Spence, 1977; Epple and
Raviv, 1978; Polinsky and Rogerson, 1983) or manufacturers have private information about the
safety of their products or take unobservable actions that affect product safety (Daughety and
Reinganum, 1995 and 1997).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic framework with a
representative consumer. Section 3 allows for heterogeneous demand curves and harm
propensities, and shows how the desirability of residual-manufacturer liability depends on the
correlation between these to factors.

11

Section 4 considers the distortions associated with

Early descriptive work includes Calabresi (1961) and McKean (1970).
6
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heterogeneous solvency among consumers. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are given in the
appendix.

2. The Basic Framework
We begin with the case of representative consumer purchasing a harmful product from a
perfectly competitive market. The probability that a single unit of the good will cause an
accident is π ( x, y ) , where x ≥ 0 is the manufacturer's investments in product safety and y ≥ 0 is

the consumer's precaution level. The manufacturers' investments in product safety are perfectly
observable to the consumer at the time that he makes his purchase decisions. The manufacturers
have identical constant-returns-to-scale production technologies with marginal production cost x
(we normalize the other production costs to zero). We assume that π ( x, y ) is decreasing in each
argument and is strictly convex.12 Furthermore, we assume that the marginal return from the
first dollar of investment is arbitrarily large, Lim π 1 ( x, y ) = −∞ and Lim π 2 ( x, y ) = −∞ .
x→0

13

y →0

Conditional upon an accident occurring, the social harm is h + d where h > 0 is the harm
borne by the consumer directly and d > 0 is the harm suffered by third parties.14 Consumers
are said to be insolvent or "judgment-proof" when their future assets, w, are insufficient to cover
the damages to third parties, d.15

In contrast to the consumers, manufacturers are assumed to

If π 12 ( x, y ) > 0 then the precautions are complements and if π 12 ( x, y ) < 0 then the precautions
are substitutes where π 12 ( x, y ) denotes the cross-partial derivative.
13
We adopt the notation that π 1 ( x, y ) = ∂π ( x, y ) ∂x and π 2 ( x, y ) = ∂π ( x, y ) ∂y . The
assumption in the text guarantees the existence of an interior solution.
14
If d < 0, so the activity creates social benefits, then liability will not help to encourage the
activity. The "victims" (beneficiaries in this case) would have no incentive to sue. A better
policy might be to subsidize the activity instead.
15
Note that the price that the consumers pay ex ante is not deducted from their future wealth.
This assumption is made mostly for convenience, and is quite realistic when accidents are low
12
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have deep pockets.

The representative consumer receives a marginal benefit P (q ) from

consuming the qth unit of the good. This is the inverse demand curve net of any future accident
costs and liability concerns.
We consider the class of strict liability rules, {δ c , δ m } , that allocate damages δ c ≤ w to
the consumer and δ m to the manufacturer.16 Note that this class does not include rules where the
liability depends on the actual precautions taken by the manufacturer and the consumer.
(Negligence rules, and alternative policies to strict liability, will be discussed in the conclusion.)

2.1 The Social Optimum

Social welfare, which is a function of the market quantity, q, and manufacturer and
consumer precautions, x and y, is:
q

S ( x, y, q ) = ∫ [ P( z ) − π ( x, y )(h + d ) − x − y ]dz .17

(1)

0

Conditional on precautions x and y, the socially optimal quantity sold is g(x,y) where:
P ( g ( x, y )) = π ( x, y )(h + d ) + x + y .

(2)

At this quantity, the private value of the marginal unit, P( g ( x, y )) , is exactly offset by the
expected future harm, π ( x, y )( h + d ) , plus the precaution costs, x + y . Let {x * , y * , q * } be the
first-best outcome.18

probability events. Similar results would be obtained in a world where consumers have deep
pockets but there is a low probability of being held responsible for the damages. This may be
due to difficulties in attributing harm.
16
The astute reader will notice that we are implicitly assuming that only one accident can occur
for a given consumer. This is justified if accidents occur with a random arrival rate and
economic activity ceases after the first accident.
17
Some may argue that the benefits to injurers from certain activities (e.g. rape) should not be
included in the social welfare function. Formally, one could nullify this concern by adjusting the
social harm (for example).
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2.2 The Competitive Equilibrium

In a competitive market, precautions x and y and the market quantity q are chosen by
private parties in the shadow of future liability. Manufacturers compete by offering price-safety
pairs, {p,x}, to attract the representative consumer. They are the "leaders," choosing precautions
first, while the consumers are the "followers," subsequently choosing their precautions. The
competitive equilibrium, {xˆ , yˆ , qˆ} , maximizes consumer surplus subject to three constraints:

q

Max ∫ [ P ( z ) − π ( x, y )(h + δ c ) − y − p ]dz
{ p , x}

(3)

0

s.t.

− π 2 ( x, y )(h + δ c ) − 1 = 0
P( q) = π ( x, y )( h + δ c ) + y + p
p ≥ x + π ( x, y )δ m .

The first constraint reflects the fact that consumers choose their precautions, y, to
minimize their expected private costs associated with product use, π ( x, y )(h + δ c ) + y . (Under
our assumptions the solution to the associated first-order condition is the unique maximum.) The
second constraint reflects the fact that the representative consumer chooses to consume up to the
point where his marginal value of consumption, P(q), is exactly offset by his expected marginal
cost, π ( x, y )(h + δ c ) + y + p . The final constraint simply reflects the fact that manufacturers
must earn non-negative profit margins.
This program gives us important insights into the desirability of different liability rules.
The first constraint suggests that the consumer under-invests in product safety when δ c < d and

18

The first-order conditions are − π i ( x * , y * )(h + d ) − 1 = 0 for i = 1,2, and q* = g ( x * , y * ) .

9
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over-invests when δ c > d . All else equal, consumers should bear full responsibility for the
third-party injuries that their product use causes. Second, when the last constraint binds (so
manufacturers earn zero profits) then the second constraint implies that the market quantity will
satisfy P( q) = π ( x, y )(h + δ c + δ m ) + x + y . Conditional on safety measures x and y, the market
quantity (or level of economic activity) is socially optimal if and only if the third-party victim is
compensated in full for his damages, δ c + δ m = d .

In other words, when δ c + δ m = d

consumer's total cost of consumption reflects all of the ex post social costs, including the harm to
third parties.

2.3 Welfare Analysis

Proposition 2.1: If the representative consumer is fully solvent ( w ≥ d ) then the first-best
market outcome is achieved by the perfectly competitive market if, and only if, the consumer
alone pays for third-party damages ( δ c = d and δ m = 0 ). If the representative consumer is
insolvent ( w < d ) then the strict liability rule that achieves the highest possible social welfare
puts primary responsibility for third-party harm on the consumer and residual responsibility on
the manufacturer, ( δ c = w and δ m = d − w ).

The formal proof is given in the appendix. When consumers are fully solvent, consumeronly liability ( δ c = d and δ m = 0 ) leads the representative consumer to fully internalize the
social cost of their product use.

He demands the socially optimal safety features from

manufacturers, invests optimally in precautions, and engages in the appropriate level of
economic activity.

Consumer-only liability fails to achieve desirable outcomes when the
10
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representative consumer is insolvent: he takes too little care, demands too few safety features,
and consumes too much.
A better rule -- indeed the best rule within the class of strict liability rules -- is residualmanufacturer liability.

The manufacturer who produced the product is held liable for the

shortfall in damages when the consumer who caused the accident has insufficient assets to
compensate the third-party victim. More generally, this rule is given by δ c = min{d , w} and

δ m = d − min{d , w} .

When consumers are insolvent, residual-manufacturer liability leads

manufacturers to (1) choose appropriate manufacturer precautions and (2) set the price at a level
where the market quantity is socially optimal in light of these investments.

2.4 Discussion

The basic model can be extended in number of ways without changing the conclusion.
First, the harms caused by an accident can be stochastic instead of deterministic. The harm
borne by the consumer, h, can simply be reinterpreted as the mean or expected harm and nothing
in the expressions would change. Introducing noise to the third-party damages, d, complicates
the analysis somewhat because the general liability rule would need to specify the allocation for
each realization of damages, {δ c (d ), δ m ( d )} . Residual-manufacturer liability would still be the
optimal rule, however: the consumer would pay for the third-party damages to the extent that his
wealth allows,

δ c (d ) = min{d , w} , and the manufacturer would bear the shortfall,

δ m ( d ) = d − min{d , w} .
Other policy instruments, such as taxation and mandatory insurance policies for
consumers, will perform well on some -- but not all -- dimensions.

These alternative

instruments, if carefully chosen, will achieve the desirable level of economic activity. They will
11
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not by themselves get consumers to take additional care or manufacturers to implement socially
desirable safety features, however. These alternative instruments would need to be coupled with
other instruments -- regulations or negligence-based liability rules perhaps -- in order to mimic
all of the benefits of residual-manufacturer liability.
The optimality of residual-manufacturer liability is maintained with some forms of
consumer heterogeneity. Importantly, the representative consumer's inverse demand curve P(q )
can be reinterpreted as representing a continuum of consumers who differ in the value they place
on consuming a single unit of the good. Residual-manufacturer liability is socially desirable so
long as the different consumer types all have the same solvency and the same propensity to cause
social harm, h.

The next two sections highlight why residual-manufacturer liability may be

undesirable when these other forms of heterogeneity are introduced.

3. Heterogeneous Risk Posed by Consumers
This section focuses on the problem that arises when consumers differ in both their
willingness to pay for the product and also in the social harm that their product use causes. In
contrast to the last section, where consumers were homogeneous and residual-manufacturer
liability led to socially desirable market outcomes, here we show that residual-manufacturer
liability distorts the market quantity when consumers' willingness to pay and the expected social
harm are correlated. Indeed, residual-manufacturer liability may create such large distortions in
the level of economic activity that it would be better to have no manufacturer liability at all.
The firearms example provides intuition for this last idea. Suppose there are two types of
gun buyers, criminals and law abiders, each of whom has unit demand. A gun creates more
social harm in the hands of a criminal than in the hands of a law abider. Imagine that criminals

12
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are willing to pay more for firearms than law abiders. Notice that the marginal purchaser (i.e.
the consumer who is indifferent between buying the gun and not buying the gun at the going
price) is more likely to be a law abider than the average purchaser. It follows that the marginal
purchaser causes less social harm than the average purchaser of the product. Since the strict
liability rule "taxes" manufacturers for the average social harm that their products cause
(assuming they cannot distinguish the two consumer types), the market price will be inefficiently
high and the market quantity inefficiently low. Taken to the extreme, guns will be driven off the
market, even if the positive social surplus associated with the use of law abiders outweighs the
social losses associated with criminal use.19 To put it differently, there is a cross-subsidy where
low-risk consumers pay for dangers created by the high-risk consumers, and low-risk consumers
will therefore be over-deterred from purchasing and using the product.20

3.1 The Model

Suppose there are two types of customers, i = H, L. If a type i consumer purchases one
unit of the product, the expected social harm to third parties is ∆ i .21 We assume that type H

19

Previous commentators have argued that manufacturer liability for gun misuse is optimal,
because it will force criminals to internalize the cost of their activity. See Note, Absolute
Liability for Ammunition, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1679 (1995); Note, Manufacturers’ Strict Liability
for Handgun Injuries: An Economic Analysis, 73 Geo. L.J. 1437 (1985). The problem with that
assertion is that liability will force law-abiding gun owners to bear much of the cost of criminal
uses, since that cost will probably be built into the price of all guns. Liability will therefore
overdeter law-abiding users. A critical question is whether that overdeterrent effect outweighs
the benefits of liability. With the exception of Hay's (1999) informal analysis, this is unaddressed
in the literature.
20
If instead the consumers' private benefits of consumption were negatively correlated with the
social harm -- if law abiders cause more social harm than criminals -- then the marginal
purchaser causes more social harm than the average purchaser. In this case, residualmanufacturer liability would lead to a price that is too low and a quantity that is too high and is
better than consumer-only liability.
21
This corresponds to πd from the last section.
13
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consumers cause more social harm than type L consumers: ∆ H > ∆ L > 0 . The inverse demand
curve of type i consumers is Pi (q ) and we let the corresponding demand curve be Di ( p ) . As in
the simple example above, we assume that consumers do not suffer personal damages from
product use ( h = 0 ) and are all totally insolvent or judgment proof ex post (w = 0). Neither the
manufacturer nor the consumers take precautions here: manufacturing costs are normalized to
zero and there is no "moral hazard" problem for consumers.
Two liability rules will be compared here: residual-manufacturer liability and consumeronly liability. We will assume that it is impossible for manufacturers to distinguish between the
two types of customers and therefore manufacturers cannot price discriminate. This is important
because, under residual-manufacturer liability, manufacturers face higher expected liability costs
when selling to a type H consumer.

Indeed, if the consumers' types were observable to

manufacturers then type H consumers would be forced to pay a higher price than their type L
counterparts.

3.2 The Constrained Social Optimum

Suppose that a social planner can choose the market price, but cannot discriminate
between the two different consumer types. The planner chooses the price to maximize social
welfare:
DH (p)
DL(p)
∫ [PH (z) − ∆H ]dz + ∫ [PL(z) − ∆L ]dz
0
0

Differentiating this expression with respect to the price, p, gives us:

∆ D ′ ( ~p ) + ∆L DL′ ( ~p )
~
p= H H ~
= MH ( ~
p) .
DH′ ( p ) + DL′ ( ~
p)

14
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This equation has a nice interpretation: it says that the second-best market price, ~
p , equals the
incremental social harm associated with the sale of one additional unit, or the "marginal social
harm," at that price, MH ( ~
p ) . Intuitively, suppose that price falls ever so slightly so that exactly
one more unit is sold. With probability DH′ ( ~
p ) /[ DH′ ( ~
p ) + DL′ ( ~
p )] the additional unit is sold to a
type H consumer, and with probability DL′ ( ~
p ) /[ DH′ ( ~
p ) + DL′ ( ~
p )] it is sold to a consumer of type
L. Multiplying these probabilities by the associated social harms, ∆ H and ∆ L , we see that the
second-best market price, ~
p , equals the marginal social cost associated with the additional unit.

3.3 The Competitive Equilibrium

With consumer-only liability, competition drives the market price down to the marginal
cost of production which we have normalized to zero: p C = 0 . Since consumers are insolvent ex
post, the competitive market does not internalize the social harm to nonconsumers and the
market quantity (or "level of economic activity") is too high.
With residual-manufacturer liability, the competitive equilibrium price will rise to reflect
the manufacturers' future expected liability. Since a manufacturer cannot control who buys his
product the manufacturer's expected liability for each unit sold is based on market averages. The
average harm caused by each unit of the product sold when the market price reflects the total
social harm, TH ( p ) = ∆ H DH ( p ) + ∆ L DL ( p ) , divided by the total quantity demanded,
DH ( p ) + DL ( p ) .

In the competitive equilibrium, the market price P R

reflects the

manufacturer's expected liability associated with a sale:
pR =

∆ H DH ( p R ) + ∆ L DL ( p R )
= AH ( p R ) .
R
R
DH ( p ) + DL ( p )

15
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Comparing this expression with the social planner's constrained optimum shows that
residual-manufacturer liability will not generally achieve the second-best outcome. Since the
average social harm may exceed the marginal social harm and vice versa, residual-manufacturer
liability can lead to market quantities that are either too high or too low. Indeed, it may be the
case the market quantity is distorted so much by residual-manufacturer liability that it would be
better to have consumer-only liability instead.

3.4 Welfare Analysis

The relative desirability of residual-manufacturer liability hinges on the elasticities of
demand for the two consumer types, ε H ( p ) and ε L ( p ) . For the remainder of this section, we
will assume that the two types of consumer can be ranked according to these elasticities, i.e.
either ε H ( p ) < ε L ( p ) for all prices, p, or the reverse where ε i ( p) = −

pDi′ ( p)
.
Di ( p)

Lemma 3.1: The average harm to third parties exceeds the marginal harm, AH ( p) > MH ( p) ,
if and only if the more harmful consumer group has a less elastic demand than the less harmful
group, ε H ( p ) < ε L ( p ) .

This result is important for assessing the social desirability of manufacturer liability.

If

the two groups have the same elasticities, ε H ( p ) ≡ ε L ( p ) , then the relative proportions of the
two consumer types among all purchasers is the same regardless of the market price. When the
"marginal harm" and the "average harm" are the same, the competitive manufacturers
appropriately internalize the harms that their products cause to nonconsumers.

In this special
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case, strict liability yields the second-best market outcome because the competitive market sets
the correct market price.

When ε H ( p ) ≠ ε L ( p ) , however, then the marginal harm and the

average harm will typically diverge and so the second-best is not obtained.

Proposition 3.2:

The equilibrium market prices under consumer-only liability ( p C ) and

residual-manufacturer liability ( p R ) may be ranked with respect to the constrained social
optimum ( ~
p ).

When ε H ( p ) ≡ ε L ( p ) , we have p R = ~
p > p C ; when ε H ( p ) > ε L ( p ) we have

~
p > p R > p C ; and when ε H ( p ) < ε L ( p ) we have p R > ~
p > pC .

When ε H ( p ) > ε L ( p ) then the harmful consumers have a more elastic demand curve
than the less harmful group. According to the lemma, the average harm is less than the marginal
harm. The competitive market is being "under-taxed" (so to speak) for the product and so the
equilibrium price is too low. Although the second-best outcome is not achieved, it is easy to see
that residual-manufacturer liability is preferred to consumer-only liability. Although it does not
achieve the first-best outcome, residual-manufacturer liability performs better than consumeronly liability.
When ε H ( p ) < ε L ( p ) , on the other hand, the more harmful consumer group has a less
elastic demand curve than the less harmful group. The average harm exceeds the marginal harm
in this case and so the manufacturers are being "over-taxed" under residual-manufacturer
liability. The equilibrium market price is too high and the equilibrium market quantity is too
low.

To put it another way, the low risk consumers are being inefficiently driven out of the

market because they are forced to subsidize their high-risk counterparts. The next proposition
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states that consumer liability becomes more desirable (relative to residual-manufacturer liability)
when the distance between the harm levels caused by the two types increases.

Proposition 3.3: If ∆ H rises and ∆ L falls while holding the average harm AH ( p ) at price p R
fixed, then (i) social welfare under consumer-only liability rises if and only if ε H ( p ) < ε L ( p )
and (ii) social welfare under residual-manufacturer liability is unchanged.

3.5 Discussion

We have seen that residual-manufacturer liability can have disastrous market
consequences when the harmful consumers are less price sensitive than their less harmful
counterparts. This is quite intuitive. When the harmful consumers have a relatively inelastic
demand, the harm caused by the average consumer who purchases the product exceeds the harm
caused by the marginal consumer.

The residual-manufacturer liability rule induces the

competitive manufacturers to raise the price above the socially optimal level, creating a chilling
effect on economic activity. The consumers who cause the least social harm are the first to be
driven from the market; the consumers who cause the most social harm are the ones more likely
to remain. In these situations, consumer-only liability may be preferable because it keeps the
less harmful consumers in the market.22
Social welfare would of course be higher if an all-knowing social planner could fine-tune
the policies to reflect the marginal harms instead. Damage multipliers could provide such an
instrument: the multiplier would be less than one when consumers with less elastic demands

22

Consumer-only liability may, of course, have a host of unfortunate consequences as well. As
shown in section 2, manufacturers will take insufficient safety precautions in designing their
products and the consumers’ level of economic activity will be too high.
18
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cause more social harm and greater than one when the less elastic consumers cause less social
harm. Alternatively, the social planner could impose a tax on the market to reflect the marginal
social harm.

Both policies would require that the court understand a host of market

characteristics including the nature of demand curves, harm levels, and correlations, etc.
Furthermore, both alternatives would compromise the desirable impact manufacturer liability has
on the design of product safety features.

4. Heterogeneous Financial Assets
This section introduces a second kind of consumer heterogeneity: heterogeneous financial
assets. Proportion θ of the consumer population, the "type 0" consumers, are completely
insolvent following an accident ( w0 = 0 ). Proportion 1 − θ of the consumer population, the
"type 1" consumers, are fully solvent ( w1 > d ). Following the notation from Section 2, the
socially-efficient precautions are the same for the two groups, x0* = x1* = x * and y0* = y1* = y * .
Finally, we assume that the probability of an accident is additively separable in manufacturer and
consumer precautions, or equivalently π 12 ( x, y ) = 0 . This assumption simplifies the analysis
because a consumer's choice of precautions, y, is independent of the product's safety features, x.
As in Section 2, consumers care both about price and product safety features. We will
characterize incentive-compatible pairs of product offerings, { p0 , x0 } and { p1 , x1} , where the
judgment-proof consumers select the former product and the solvent consumers select the latter
product. A pair of product offerings is a competitive equilibrium if no manufacturer can earn
positive profits by deviating to a different price-safety combination. The equilibrium is said to
be pooling when { p0 , x 0 } = { p1 , x1} and separating otherwise.
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4.1 Example

To start, let's ignore precautions and assume that the probability of an accident is
exogenously given and identical for solvent and insolvent consumers: π = 1 / 3 . Suppose further
that the consumers all have unit demands with valuation v (which we will vary). The consumers
do not bear any direct harm from an accident, h = 0, but third-parties suffer damages in the event
of an accident, d = 12. Finally, suppose that half of all consumers are insolvent ( θ = 1 / 2 ). We
will see that both consumer-only liability and residual-manufacturer liability are inefficient and
lead to very different economic distortions.
Let's start with the case of consumer-only liability. The competitive manufacturers drive
the price down to marginal cost, normalized to zero. A solvent consumer internalizes all of the
social harm that his product use causes and purchases when v ≥ πd = 4 , the socially efficient
outcome. The insolvent consumers do not internalize the third-party harms, purchasing the
product whenever v > 0 . In other words, consumer-only liability leads to an efficient level of
economic activity for the solvent consumers but an excessive level for the insolvent consumers.
Residual-manufacturer liability, on the other hand, leads to the efficient outcome for the
insolvent consumers but insufficient quantities for the solvent consumers. To see why, suppose
that both types of consumers are served in the competitive equilibrium. The equilibrium price
would reflect the average manufacturer liability, or p = θπd = 2 . The solvent consumers are
willing to purchase the product when v ≥ πd + θπd = 6 . This decision rule is socially inefficient
because consumers "should" purchase the product when v > πd = 4 . Intuitively, a distortion
arises because the solvent consumer pays twice for the third-party harm: through his own
personal liability ex post, and also through the inflated price. If all of the solvent consumers are
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driven out of the market, the market price rises to p = πd = 4 to reflect the liability cost
associated with insolvent consumers only and the insolvent consumers subsequently make the
efficient purchase decision.
This example suggests that residual-manufacturer liability will be preferred when there
are many insolvent consumers in the population, but is inferior when the proportion is low. The
next sub-sections extend this basic insight to the more general case where the precautions of the
manufacturers and consumers are choice variables and demand curves are downward sloping.

4.2 Consumer-Only Liability

With consumer-only liability consumers are responsible for third-party injuries to the
extent that their wealth allows. The third-party victim is made whole when the consumer is fully
solvent, {δ1c , δ1m } = {d ,0} , but goes uncompensated when the consumer is insolvent,
{δ 0c , δ 0m } = {0,0} .
As a benchmark, suppose that there is complete information about the consumers' types.
From Section 2 we know that, for the solvent consumers, the precaution levels ( x * , y * ) minimize
the total social costs associated with a sale, π ( x, y )(h + d ) + x + y . The precaution levels for the
insolvent consumers, on the other hand, would minimize the total private costs associated with a
sale, π ( x, y )h + x + y and so the equilibrium precautions, ( x, y ) , are too low.

The next

proposition states that this outcome is obtained with incomplete information as well.

Proposition 4.1: In the unique competitive equilibrium with consumer-only liability, the solvent
consumers

purchase

{ p1C , x1C } = {x * , x * }

and

the

insolvent

consumers

purchase
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{ p0C , x0C } = {x, x} where x < x * . The solvent consumers take the efficient precautions, y1C = y * ,
and consume the right amount, q1C = g ( x * , y * ) .

The insolvent consumers underinvest in

precautions, y0C = y < y * , and consume too much, q0C = g ( x, y ) ).

The insolvent customers do not care enough about safety and the competitive market
gives them exactly what they want: a cheap and relatively dangerous product.

They

subsequently put in too little care to avoid accidents and consume too much. The fully solvent
consumers, on the other hand, are held personally accountable for any third-party damages and
therefore demand safer products from the manufacturers, x1C = x * , and use them prudently,
y1C = y * . The competitive market supplies the solvent consumers "efficiently." When θ = 0 all
consumers are fully solvent and consumer liability alone achieves the first-best market outcome.
Social welfare is clearly falling in θ , the proportion of insolvent consumers.

4.3 Residual-Manufacturer Liability

Suppose instead that the manufacturer is responsible for the shortfall in damages not paid
by the insolvent consumer. The third-party victim is compensated in full by the consumer if the
consumer is fully solvent, {δ1c , δ1m } = {d ,0} , and is compensated in full by the manufacturer if the
consumer is insolvent, {δ 0c , δ 0m } = {0, d } . As a benchmark, suppose that there is full information
and that the competitive manufacturers can discriminate between the two consumer types, setting
a different safety-price pair for each.

22
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Lemma 4.2: Suppose the consumers' types are observable. With residual-manufacturer liability,
the

market

offers

{ p1R , x1R } = {x * , x *}

to

the

solvent

consumers

and

{ p0R , x0R } =

{x * + π ( x * , y )d , x * } to the insolvent consumers. The fully solvent consumers take the efficient
level of precautions, y1R = y * , while the insolvent consumers take too few precautions,
y0R = y < y * . Conditional on the precautions levels, the efficient market quantities are obtained.

With full information and residual-manufacturer liability, the competitive firms choose
the socially optimal precautions, x0R = x1R = x * , but set different prices for the two groups. The
fully solvent consumers are cheap to serve because there is no future "shortfall" for the
manufacturers to pay. Consequently, p1R reflects the marginal production cost only. Insolvent
consumers, on the other hand, are expensive to serve since the manufacturer is liable for the
social harm that the insolvent consumers cause. The price that the insolvent consumers must
pay, x * + π ( x * , y )d , includes a premium to reflect the anticipated future liability of the
manufacturer. To put it somewhat differently, solvent consumers pay ex post for the harm that
they cause while the insolvent consumers pay ex ante through a higher market price.
This full-information benchmark is not sustainable when the consumers' types are
unobservable. Since the insolvent consumers pay a higher price than their solvent counterparts,
p0R > p1R , the insolvent consumers would obviously pretend to be solvent in order to secure the
lower price. In other words, the full-information outcome in Lemma 4.2 is not incentive
compatible.
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Lemma 4.3: Suppose the consumers’ types are not observable. A pooling equilibrium does not
exist with residual-manufacturer liability.

This result is quite intuitive. If a pooling equilibrium did exist, the market price would
have to be inflated to reflect the manufacturers' liability associated with the insolvent consumers.
Consumers who are solvent face personal liability of third-party harm, and therefore place
greater weight on product safety than their insolvent counterparts. A clever manufacturer could
skim off these safety-sensitive consumers in the following way: offer a safer product at a price
that only the solvent consumers would prefer.

The manufacturer would then avoid future

liability himself and earn a positive profit margin.
This intuition is applicable in understanding the separating equilibrium as well. The
market supplies a product with optimal built-in manufacturer precautions to the insolvent
consumers who pay for manufacturers' future liability up front through an inflated price. If the
solvent consumers purchased this product, too, they would effectively have to pay twice for
liability: once up front through the market price and then later on when a third party is suffers
damages. But the competitive market supplies the solvent consumers with a very different
product -- a safer product at a higher price. This ultra-safe product is priced "fairly" -- the
solvent consumers are only paying the manufacturing costs and so their purchase decisions are
efficient given the safety measures. But the safety measures themselves are inefficiently high.

Proposition 4.4: Suppose that consumers' types are unobservable. With residual-manufacturer
liability there exists a unique separating equilibrium when θ , the proportion of insolvent
consumers, is not too small. The fully solvent consumers purchase { p1R , x1R } = {x, x} where
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x > x * and the insolvent consumers purchase { p0R , x0R } = {x * + π ( x * , y )d , x *} .23

The fully

solvent consumers take the efficient precautions, y1R = y * , while the insolvent consumers take
too few precautions, y0R = y < y * . Conditional on the precaution levels, the efficient market
quantities are obtained.

When θ , the proportion of insolvent consumers, is small then a competitive equilibrium
fails to exist. The reason is simple: a clever manufacturer could profitably deviate from the
separating equilibrium and offer a product with optimal safety features (x*) and a relatively low
price that both consumer types would prefer. This is analogous to Rothschild and Stiglitz's
(1976) famous result that competitive insurance markets may have no equilibrium.
Many authors have suggested changes to the Rothchild-Stiglitz timing that serve to
restore the existence of equilibrium. Riley (1979) proposed a dynamic adjustment process where
firms could modify their product offerings in light of a deviation. Our separating equilibrium in
Proposition 4.4 is a so-called "Reactive Equilibrium" when θ is low as well. The idea behind
this is that if a deviator did indeed make an offer that both types of consumer preferred, then
another firm could react to this deviation and skim off the solvent consumers along the lines of
Lemma 4.3. The robustness of the separating equilibrium for low θ is sensitive to the particular
dynamic process, however.

Indeed, Wilson (1977) restored the existence of a pooling

equilibrium in Rothschild-Stiglitz by allowing the non-deviating firms to withdraw, but not
modify, their offers in light of a deviation.

These extensions, and other refinements, are

surveyed in Riley (2001).
The value x is endogenous and implicitly defined by x * + π ( x * , y )(h + d ) = x + π ( x , y )h .
The proof is given in the appendix.

23

25
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

4.4 Discussion
We end this section by comparing the outcomes in Propositions 4.1 and 4.4. With
consumer-only liability the competitive market provided the solvent consumers with efficient
safety features, x1C = x * , but the insolvent consumers with inefficiently low levels of safety
features, x0C = x . On the other hand, with residual-manufacturer liability the market supplies
efficient safety features to the insolvent consumers, x0R = x * , but excessive safety features to the
solvent customers, x1R = x . Not surprisingly, the former outcome is preferred when there are
sufficiently many solvent consumers in the population but not when the population is dominated
by insolvent consumers.

Proposition 4.5 There exists a cutoff, θ ′′ ∈ (0, 1) . If the proportion of insolvent consumers is
above this cutoff, θ > θ ′′ , then the separating outcome with residual-manufacturer liability is
strictly preferred to the equilibrium with consumer-only liability. If the proportion of insolvent
consumers is below this cutoff, θ ≤ θ ′′ , then consumer-only liability is preferred.

5. Conclusion
There are sound economic reasons to hold manufacturers liable for the injuries that their
products cause to non-consumers. Since consumers typically cannot be held responsible for
100% of the harms that they cause, placing liability on consumers alone will lead to the overconsumption of products with inadequate safety features.

In a representative-consumer

framework, the best strict liability rule holds the consumer liable for third-party damages up to
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the point that their financial assets allow, and then holds the manufacturer liable for the shortfall
in damages.24 However, when consumers are heterogeneous, residual-manufacturer liability can
lead to undesirable distortions in the market quantities and safety features.
The formal analysis in this paper ignored the costs of the legal system and assumed that
victims were automatically compensated for their losses. Holding manufactures liable would
only make practical sense if the shortfall in damages not paid by consumers (and the associated
benefits of manufacturer liability) was large enough to justify the added expense and transactions
costs associated with the litigation process. Residual-manufacturer liability may also backfire if
overly-sympathetic juries grant astronomical jury awards, chilling the economic activity. (Note,
however, that damage caps may control runaway jury awards and restore the proper market
outcomes.)
As mentioned earlier, taxes may be a viable alternative to residual-manufacturer
liability.25 The optimal tax, which would reflect the marginal social harm, could be imposed on
either the manufacturers or the consumers. Although taxation may have lower transactions costs
than residual-manufacturer liability, it has several important drawbacks. First, the planner would
require both the time and the ability to fine-tune the taxes on a market-by-market basis. Second,
a tax by itself would provide inadequate incentives for manufacturers to design safer products.
A negligence rule that holds manufacturers liable if their safety features fall short of acceptable
levels -- or regulations geared at product safety directly -- may prove useful supplements to
taxation.

Note, however, that liability has the advantage of putting responsibility for safety in

24

The asymmetry in the treatment comes from the assumption that consumers observe product
attributes at the time of purchase but manufacturers cannot observe or control consumer care.
25
See Carlton and Loury, 1980 and Hamilton, 1998, for discussions of Pigouvian taxation in the
liability context.
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the hands of experts -- manufacturers are surely better informed about the feasibility of product
modifications than regulators.
Alternatively, consumers of risky products could be forced to hold insurance policies. If
insurance providers cannot discriminate among the different types of consumers, then the
competitive insurance premiums would reflect the average rather than the marginal harm and the
market quantity would be distorted. Furthermore, in the absence of manufacturer liability and
other regulations product safety regulations, manufacturers would have insufficient incentives to
produce safer products. In sum, mandatory insurance leads to the same distortions as taxation.
The results of this paper raise the natural question -- and concern -- about where the chain
of corporate responsibility should end. The model assumed a single manufacturer, but harmful
activities will often involve multiple products and multiple suppliers. Guns, for example, are
especially dangerous when they are loaded with bullets. Should the ammunition manufacturer be
held liable for deaths and injuries as well? Timothy McVeigh created the bomb that destroyed
the Oklahoma City Federal Building by loading a mixture of fertilizer with diesel fuel -purchased at a Conoco service station -- into a rented Ryder truck.

Should Conoco and Ryder

be held responsible for the 168 lives that were lost?
A stark implication from the formal analysis is that -- absent supplier incentive and
consumer heterogeneity issues -- the level of the harmful activity will be optimal when the sum

of the expected liabilities of all contributing components is equal the expected harm.26 But
clearly incentives are important. All else equal, a greater share should be borne by those who are
in a better position to reduce the probability or the magnitude of social harm. Manufacturers
should be given the incentive to design and produce safer products. Retailers of dangerous
26

Also, placing liability on a smaller number of suppliers should reduce the administrative costs
associated with liability.
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products need incentives to conduct customer background checks, institute waiting periods, and
the like. Consumer heterogeneity is also important. If a key component of a harmful activity is a
product that is particularly valuable only for that one harmful activity, then suppliers of that
component should bear the burden of liability.27
Even when incentive issues are absent, the problem of optimally assigning liability to
products and services which may jointly be used to conduct harmful activities is complicated and
analogous to an optimal tax problem. The social planner would like to "tax" the harmful activity
directly, but the activity can only be proxied by a bundle of necessary components. The tax
burden should then be allocated to minimize the deadweight loss in the respective markets.28 In
the fertilizer bomb example above, placing primary responsibility on fuel companies would
probably be a policy mistake. The burden of liability would fall on the legitimate diesel fuel
users whose durable equipment is dedicated to diesel fuel use -- the deadweight loss would be
large. Placing liability on ammonium nitrate manufacturers, on the other hand, may make more
sense. As the price of ammonium nitrate rises, the primary users -- farmers and landscapers -may tend to substitute to harmless alternatives (such as ammonium sulfate). If the harmless
alternative is a good substitute, then the deadweight loss associated with residual-manufacturer

27

The Black Talon, for example, is an exploding bullet designed for the purpose of maiming
victims. In one case, suburban commuters were shot by a deranged individual named Colin
Ferguson. The victims sued the bullet's manufacturer, claiming that the product was excessively
dangerous. The court threw the case out on the pleadings, explaining: "The very purpose of the
Black Talon bullet is to kill or cause severe wounding. Here, plaintiffs concede that the Black
Talons performed precisely as intended by the manufacturer." McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119
F.3d 148, 155 (2d Cir. 1997).
28
At the optimum, it is not necessarily the case that the level of the harmful activity will be
socially optimal. The social planner has to trade off the need to chill the harmful activity against
the costs of distorting the safe activity.
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liability will be small.29 These, and other extensions of the basic analysis, remain fruitful areas
for further research.

29

The Philippines recently outlawed the import of ammonium nitrate. See " 'Explosive'
Fertilizer Material Banned," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 26, 2002. There is some
concern about the fate of the mango fruit industry, the main legitimate consumer of the
ammonium nitrate. Proponents of the ban argue that farmers can easily substitute to ammonium
sulfate instead.
30
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7. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1: As a benchmark, suppose a social planner could directly choose
manufacturer precautions, x, the market quantity, q, and the consumer's liability, δ c . The
representative consumer remains free to choose his own precautions, y, and does so to minimize
his expected costs: π ( x, y )(h + δ c ) + y .

Later, we will show that the competitive market

achieves this benchmark.
Our earlier assumptions guarantee a unique interior solution for the representative
consumer's optimization problem. Consumer precautions may be written as an implicit function
of the manufacturer precautions, x, and the liability rule, δ c : y = f ( x, δ c ) . Our assumptions
also imply that fδ ( x, δ c ) > 0 (i.e. the consumer takes more care when his personal liability is
higher). Holding x fixed, if δ c < d ( δ c > d ) then the consumer under-invests (over-invests) in
precautions relative to what a social planner would do. Therefore the best liability rule in this
benchmark case has δ c = min{d , w} . Substituting this into the social welfare function in (1), the
social planner would choose x and q to maximize:
q

∫ [ P( z ) − π ( x, f ( x, min{d , w}))(h + d ) − x − f ( x, min{d , w})]dz .

0

The solution, {x ** , y ** , q ** } , satisfies:

x ** = arg min π ( x, f ( x, min{d , w})( h + d ) + x + f ( x, min{d , w}) ,

(3')

x

y ** = f ( x ** , min{d , w}) ,
P( q ** ) = π ( x ** , y ** )(h + d ) + x ** + y ** .

Now we will compare this benchmark solution, {x ** , y ** , q ** } , to the competitive equilibrium
defined by the program in (3), {xˆ , yˆ , qˆ} .

Claim: {xˆ , yˆ , qˆ} = {x ** , y ** , q ** } if and only if δ c = min{d , w} and δ m = d − min{d , w} .
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Proof of claim: It is clear that the last constraint in program (3) binds, p = x + π ( x, y )δ m . Since
consumer surplus is falling in p, the market price, the competitive manufacturers' profit margins
are driven to zero.

We can substitute this zero-profit condition and the constraint that

y = f ( x, δ c ) (which is equivalent to the first constraint in (3)) into the objective function. The
new program is:
q

Max ∫ [ P ( z ) − π ( x, f ( x, δ c ))(h + δ m + δ c ) − x − f ( x, δ c )]dz
x

(3")

0

s.t.

P( q) = π ( x, y )(h + δ c + δ m ) + x + f ( x, δ c )

Since quantity q is chosen optimally given x and y, the envelope theorem tells us that we
can disregard the affect on quantity q when looking for the manufacturer's precaution choice, x.
The competitive equilibrium, {xˆ , yˆ , qˆ} , is therefore the solution to the following system of
equations:

xˆ = arg min π ( x, f ( x, δ c ))(h + δ c + δ m ) + x + f ( x, δ c )

(3"')

x

yˆ = f ( xˆ , δ c )
P( qˆ ) = π ( xˆ , yˆ )(h + δ c + δ m ) + xˆ + yˆ .

{xˆ , yˆ , qˆ} corresponds to the benchmark outcome {x ** , y ** , q ** } defined above if and only if

δ c = min{d , w} and δ m = d − min{d , w} . Finally, if δ c = d and δ m = 0 then the first-best is
obtained: ( xˆ , yˆ , qˆ ) = ( x ** , y ** , q** ) = ( x * , y * , q* ) .
Q.E.D.

Proof

of

Lemma

3.1:

AH ( p) > MH ( p)

∆ H DH ( p ) + ∆ L DL ( p ) ∆ H DH′ ( p ) + ∆ L DL′ ( p )
>
.
DH ( p ) + DL ( p )
DH′ ( p ) + DL′ ( p )

is

true

if

and

only

if:

Cross multiplying (and recognizing that

DH′ ( p ) + DL′ ( p ) < 0 ) gives:
[∆ H DH ( p ) + ∆ L DL ( p )][DH′ ( p ) + DL′ ( p )] < [∆ H DH′ ( p ) + ∆ L DL′ ( p )][DH ( p ) + DL ( p )] .
Rearranging terms:
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[∆ H − ∆ L ]DH ( p )DL′ ( p ) < [∆ H − ∆ L ]DH′ ( p ) DL ( p ) .
The [∆ H − ∆ L ] term is positive (by assumption) and cancels.

Dividing both sides by

DH ( p )DL ( p ) and multiplying by − p gives:
−

pDL′ ( p )
pDH′ ( p )
,
>−
DL ( p )
DH ( p )

and so we have ε L ( p ) > ε H ( p ) .
Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 3.3: With no liability, the market price is p C = 0 regardless of the social
harm. The social welfare at this price does depend on the social harm, however. Differentiating
the social welfare function with respect to ∆ H and recognizing that ∆ L is an implicit function of

∆ H gives us:
 d∆ ( ∆ ) 
dΩ( p C )
= − DH ( p C ) −  L H DL ( p C ) .
d∆ H
 d∆ H 
Since the average harm is constant, total differentiation gives us
d∆ L ( ∆ H )
D ( pR )
=− H R .
d∆ H
DL ( p )
Substituting this expression,

which is true if and only if

 D ( pR ) 
dΩ( p C )
> 0 if and only if − DH ( p C ) +  H R  DL ( p C ) > 0 ,
d∆ H
 DL ( p ) 

DH ( p )
is increasing in price. Differentiating this expression shows
DL ( p )

that this is true when ε H ( p ) < ε L ( p ) everywhere. Finally, since the average harm at price p R
does not change, the competitive market quantity and price will not change. It follows that total
social cost remains unchanged as well. Therefore Ω( p R ) is unchanged.
Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 4.1: Suppose there is full information. It follows from Proposition 2.1 that
the solvent consumers will be efficiently supplied, {x1C , y1C , q1C } = {x * , y * , q*} . The insolvent
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consumers demand precautions where π i ( x, y )h + 1 = 0 , so x0C = x < x * and y0C = y < y * . The
market price is x * for the solvent consumers and x for the insolvent consumers. Since incentive
compatibility is satisfied, this is also the equilibrium when there is incomplete information.
Q.E.D

Proof of Lemma 4.2: As with consumer only liability, the solvent consumers will be efficiently
supplied, {x1R , y1R , q1R } = {x* , y * , q *} .

The insolvent consumers take the same low level of

precautions as before, y0R = y < y * , and the manufacturer precautions come from expression (3’),
q

Max
x

∫ [ P( z ) − π ( x0 , y )(h + d ) − x0
R

R

− y ]dz . Therefore x0R = x* and the zero-profit conditions

0

gives p0R = x * + π ( x* , y )d .
Q.E.D

Proof of Lemma 4.3:

Suppose a pooling equilibrium, { pˆ , xˆ} , did exist and let θˆ be the

proportion of insolvent types. The zero-profit condition for the manufacturers implies that
pˆ = xˆ + θˆπ ( xˆ , y )d .
In other words, the market price covers the costs of production, x̂ , plus the future expected
liability associated with the insolvent consumers. Consider the following deviation: { ~
p, ~
x}
where ~
p = pˆ + ρ and ~
x = xˆ + ε where ρ > 0 and ε > 0 . The insolvent consumer prefers { pˆ , xˆ}
to { ~
p, ~
x } and the solvent consumer prefers { ~
p, ~
x } to { pˆ , xˆ} when
[π ( xˆ, y ) − π ( xˆ + ε , y )]h < ρ < [π ( xˆ, y * ) − π ( xˆ + ε , y * )](h + d ) .
Additive separability implies that π ( xˆ, y ) − π ( xˆ + ε , y ) = π ( xˆ, y * ) − π ( xˆ + ε , y * ) . For any ε > 0
this condition is satisfied by a range of positive ρ ' s . The manufacturer offering this new
product would receive positive profits when ~
p>~
x , which after substituting ~
p and ~
x gives:

ρ > xˆ + ε − pˆ ,
and substituting for p̂ gives us:
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ρ > ε − θˆπ ( xˆ, y )d
When ε is sufficiently small then this condition is satisfied for any ρ > 0 , and therefore holds
for the range identified earlier.
Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 4.4:

Claim: In any separating equilibrium the firms earn zero profits, or equivalently { p1R , x1R } =
{ x1R , x1R } and { p0R , x0R } = {x0R + π ( x0R , y )d , x0R } .

Proof of claim: First, suppose p0R > x0R + π ( x0R , y )d . A profitable deviation exists. Suppose a
manufacturer deviates and offers a slightly lower price: { p0R − ρ , x0R } . All insolvent consumers
prefer this new contract and so the deviator captures the entire type 0 market. If the solvent
consumers prefer it, too, then all the better since the cost of serving a solvent consumer is lower.
Second, suppose that p1R > x1R . The incentive compatibility constraint for the insolvent
consumer holds that:

p0R + π ( x0R , y )h ≤ p1R + π ( x1R , y )h .

Consider a deviation where a

manufacturer offers a slightly higher price and quantity, { p1R + ρ , x1R + ε } , that gives the
insolvent consumer the same value as { p1R , x1R } , p1R + ρ + π ( x1R + ε , y )h = p1R + π ( x1R , y )h , or

ρ = [π ( x1R , y ) − π ( x1R + ε , y )]h .
The solvent consumers prefer this deviation when
p1R + ρ + π ( x1R + ε , y * )( h + d ) < p1R + π ( x1R , y * )( h + d ) , or

ρ < [π ( x1R , y * ) − π ( x1R + ε , y * )](h + d ) .
The value of ρ above and the assumption of additive separability guarantees that this is true.

Claim: x0R = x * .
Proof of claim: As we showed earlier, { p0R , x0R } = {x * + π ( x * , y )d , x *} creates the highest social
37
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

welfare for the insolvent consumers subject to the zero profit constraint. If { p0R , x0R } did not
have this form, then a profitable deviation would exist. {x * + π ( x * , y )d , x *} would attract all of
the insolvent consumers (and possibly the solvent ones, too -- a good thing).
Claim: x1R = x > x * where x is the implicit solution to: x * + π ( x * , y )(h + d ) = x + π ( x , y )h .

Proof of Claim: Given the two claims proved earlier, the IC constraints for the two types are:
(IC0):

x * + π ( x * , y )(h + d ) ≤ x1R + π ( x1R , y )h ,

(IC1):

x1R + π ( x1R , y * )( h + d ) ≤ x * + π ( x * , y )d + π ( x * , y * )( h + d ) .

(IC0) implies that x1R > x * . If (IC0) were slack, then the solvent consumers could be made better
off by lowering x1R closer to x * . It is not hard to see that if (IC0) binds then (IC1) is slack.
Rewriting a binding (IC0) as x * + π ( x * , y )d = x1R + [π ( x1R , y ) − π ( x * , y )]h and substituting
into

the

right

hand

side

of

(IC1)

gives

x1R + π ( x1R , y * )( h + d ) ≤ x1R + [π ( x1R , y ) − π ( x * , y )]h + π ( x * , y * )(h + d ) , and rearranging terms we
have
[π ( x * , y ) − π ( x1R , y )]h ≤ [π ( x * , y * ) − π ( x1R , y * )](h + d ) .
The two large terms in brackets are equal with additive separability, so (IC1) is indeed slack and
x1R = x as defined in the claim.
Claim: When θ is sufficiently large there does not exist a pooling deviation that both solvent
and insolvent consumers prefer.
Proof of claim: Consider a deviation from the proposed separating equilibrium, { ~
p, ~
x } , that is
~
preferred by both consumer types and let θ be the proportion of insolvent types at that
~
deviation. Positive profits for the deviator implies ~
p≥~
x +θ π (~
x , y )d . The deviation is preferred
p + π (~
x , y )h ≤ x * + π ( x * , y )( h + d ) . Taken together, we have
by the insolvent consumers when ~
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~
x + θπ ( ~
x , y )d + π ( ~
x , y )h ≤ x * + π ( x * , y )(h + d ) .

~
When θ = 1 then θ = 1 as well so this

x = x * and
becomes ~
x + π (~
x , y )(h + d ) ≤ x * + π ( x * , y )(h + d ) which is only satisfied when ~
~
p = x * + π ( x * , y )d . We have already seen that the solvent consumers would prefer { p1R , x1R } , a
contradiction. Continuity guarantees that this is also true when θ is sufficiently large.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.5: Let Si j = S ( xij , yij , qij ) be the social welfare associated with liability
regime j for consumers of type i. Social welfare under consumer only liability is θS0C + (1 − θ ) S1C ,
and social welfare under residual-manufacturer liability is θS0R + ( 1 − θ )S1R . Consumer-only
liability is strictly preferred if and only if
(1 − θ )( S1C − S1R ) > θ ( S0R − S0C ) .
On the left hand side we have S1C = S ( x * , y * , q* ) > S1R . In other words, the solvent consumers
are served efficiently under consumer-only liability but not under residual-manufacturer liability.
On the right hand side, S0R > S0C because although consumers make the same inefficient
precautions, y0C = y0R = y < y * , the manufacturers supply efficient safety features to the
insolvent consumers under residual-manufacturer liability, x0R = x* > x0C = x (and, furthermore,
the price rises to the point where consumers purchase the right quantity given the investments).
The result follows.
Q.E.D.

39
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

